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America’s Enablement of Rape by Fraud & a Necessary Response  
by 
Derrick Grant 
 
I. Introduction 
Rape is one of the most controversial and emotion-provoking crimes there is. There is no 
crime short of murder that is more violative of an individual’s bodily integrity and personal 
rights then when sex is procured without true consent to the act. Why the n has American rape 
law continued to allow so many clear violators of bodily integrity to walk free without 
punishment? In fact, although it sounds absurd, American rape law has for a long time enabled 
what most would consider clear violations. Take for example, a woman who is tricked into 
thinking she is having sex with her significant other, when in reality it is a stranger who takes 
advantage in the dark and procures sex with a willing, but unaware victim. If unmarried this 
woman has historically been left without recourse from the criminal justice system in almost 
every jurisdiction.1 Individuals have historically been free to lie about their identity in any way 
they please to procure sex, including lying about sexually transmitted diseases and marital s tatus 
for example.  
The law should also seek to protect those that are vulnerable in our society and punish those 
who prey on those vulnerabilities. A common scenario is a man who seeks out a woman who 
may be in need of something and falsely promises to help them to procure sex. For example, in 
an Israeli case involving a man posing as a housing official who promised to get a woman 
housing in exchange for sex, the man was convicted under a rape by fraud statute. 2  Under 
                                                 
1 People v. Morales, 150 Cal. Rptr. 3d 920, 928 (Ct. App. 2013). 
2 Saliman v. State of Israel, Israel Supreme Court, (Sept. 17, 2008). 
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American laws as they exist this man would not be considered criminal under rape laws because 
the woman consented to the sex. However, this conduct clearly involves a predatory individual 
who has sought out weaknesses in another and exploited it for his own gain. A woman who 
submits to sex under this deceit is not truly consenting when she does not understand the 
circumstances under which she is submitting and ultimately winds up violated and greatly 
harmed by this predator. This fraud is one that the law can no longer allow and it needs to be 
criminalized. 
There is no doubt in the eyes of a victim that when sex is procured through force without  
consent it is extremely harmful. In many cases it is equally true that sex procured through 
fraudulent and deceptive practices is also extremely harmful. But these individuals are not 
victims, at least not as far as most American law is concerned. In reality these individuals are 
victims and the law has for years enabled them to be victimized, rather than protected them. As 
this piece will explore, sex procured through the use of fraud or what many call rape by 
deception, ought to be more commonly criminalized in America. At the least the law needs to 
recognize the harm that occurs to women in many cases of fraudulently procured sex and 
criminalize these offenders. An individual should not be free to lie about anything and 
everything for sex, they should not be able to impersonate another, lie about their intentions or 
falsely promise benefits. Though finding a solution to this issue is tricky this piece will explore 
how the law can better protect victims of these deceptive practices through statutes that 
criminalize rape by fraud. 
II. Carving Out a Place in Criminal Law for Sex Procured Through Deception 
As modern courts have begun to recognize the archaic reasoning behind rejecting any form 
of criminalization of sex obtained through the use of fraud is no longer sound. Based on societal 
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expectations alone it is clear to me that there remains an issue in the law regarding the protection 
of victims who submit to sex under false pretenses. Though some states have started to codify 
laws that will criminalize conduct in certain sets of circumstances when sex is obtained through 
the use of fraud it still has a long way to go in order to vindicate victims and societa l 
expectations. For the reasons set forth below the law is well equipped and should criminalize 
certain fraudulent practices when employed to obtain sex. However, despite the law ’s desire to 
fit deception into existing rape laws there is no reason why fraudulently obtained rape cannot 
remain separate and distinct in statutes from forcible rape as it is generally known. Ultimately, 
the law should seek to separately criminalize rape by fraud as its own crime. 
a) Force vs. Fraud 
Force and fraud are regularly distinguished between in all other areas of criminal law. 
Though the objective of the crimes may be the same, the manner in which those objectives are 
achieved vary greatly, and as a result are criminalized as separate offenses. To put it simply, 
trying to fit rape by fraud cases into existing rape through the use of force laws is like trying to 
fit a square peg into a round hole. This is evident from a divide in case law. Many courts have 
found ways to fit rape by fraud into rape through the use of force statutes to avoid 
unconscionable results that would find some of the most offensive crimes going unpunished.3 
Other courts have regrettably made the decision to stick to the letter of their force required rape 
law and essentially find rape by fraud legal.4 The result is a complicated mess in sexual assault 
laws that allow many immoral and offensive actions to continue unpunished. 
                                                 
3 See People v. Borak, 301 N.E.2d 1 (Ill. App. Ct. 1973); See also Pomeroy v. State, 94 Ind. 96, 
101 (Ind. 1884). 
4 See State v. Mahon, 905 A.2d 678, 683 (Conn. App. Ct. 2006). 
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The beginning to the solution is recognizing that it is unnecessary and unwise to try and 
fit both types of conduct under one statute. Force and fraud can be used to achieve the same 
exact results just by very different means and in some cases the latter can be more offensive and 
harmful. Taking one of the more obvious crimes such as theft for example demonstrates the error 
in attempting to fit conduct committed by force and fraud in one category. When theft is 
committed through the use of force it is highly offensive and violates a victim’s property rights 
and in a way bodily integrity. However, when theft is committed through fraud ulent means, 
though the objective may be the same, the means are very different and often result in a violation 
of different rights.  
Take Bernie Madoff for example, who fraudulently stole millions from unsuspecting 
victim’s through his infamous ponzi scheme. If Madoff walked up to his victims and forcefully 
took the money his conduct violated property and bodily integrity rights. Instead, through the use 
of fraud, Madoff violated the same property rights as if he had committed the crime through 
force, but also took much more than that from his victims, which in many ways makes his crime 
even more offensive and deserving of punishment. When a crime such as Madoff’s is committed 
through the use of fraud in addition to a violation of property rights there is a sense of moral 
expectations, security, dignity and trust that are also violated. Victims who are defrauded will 
often feel more violated than in a forceful scenario because in the latter they may know it was 
not their fault but in the former there is a sense of self-blame for the trust and faith placed in the 
defrauder which makes the offense all the more immoral.  
This same logic applies to those who are the victims of sexual offenses procured through 
the use of fraud or deception. Though the bodily integrity violated in a rape by force case is 
incomparable to almost any harm a human can suffer, a victim may often feel equally violated 
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when their consent to sexual penetration is obtained through fraud. Indubitably when someone in 
a position of trust or authority, such as a doctor, procures sex through fraudulently passing the 
penetration off as medical treatment, the same violation of bodily integrity occurs. The fact that 
the realization of the violation does not come until after the offense is completed a nd done with, 
just like in Madoff’s case, does not change that the violation occurs. In fact the violation will be 
accompanied with many of the same feelings of a loss of sense of trust and dignity as a victim in 
Madoff’s case did. A defrauded victim may o ften have even stronger feelings of self-
blameworthiness because of the way in which the crime was committed. A victim may lose a 
sense of dignity when they feel that they allowed the crime to happen to themselves and that they 
should have been smarter in preventing it. It is important that the criminal law focus on 
punishing objective behavior by an offender but the subjective experiences of victims do not 
need to be ignored entirely. The harm that these individuals suffer is real and often immense and 
these subjective victim experiences can be categorized through objective statutes. 
The fact that these offenses are committed through entirely different means and often can 
result in different violations leads to the conclusion that they should be treated separately. It is 
evident that not only are separate rape by fraud and rape by force statutes advisable they should 
be required. Creating legal fictions in what constitutes force in the law stretches the word force 
to the point that it has no truly understandable meaning. Leaving rape by force statutes in place is 
perfectly acceptable because, like theft committed by force, the means of committing the crime 
have a long history of understanding that makes for easier applicability and predictability. Of 
course, this is assuming that separate and distinct rape by fraud statutes take the place of forcing 
fraudulent scenarios into a law that requires force. Fraud is a complex issue, which as we have 
seen in other areas of the law can develop new branches when there becomes a new means of 
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fraudulently inducing action from a victim. Having separate rape by fraud and rape by force 
statutes would likewise allow states to better respond to fraudulent conduct that does not fit into 
current statutes and adapt the law to cover the conduct when it is deemed offensive enough to 
criminalize. 
b) Legal Moralism 
Moral principles necessarily play an important role in criminalization and in turn, laws 
based on morality have a reciprocal effect on helping to form moral judgments. 5 Legal moralists 
often believe that conduct must be both harm-producing and involve moral wrongfulness in 
order to be criminalized.6 As will be discussed in further detail below Jed Rubenfeld writes an 
article in which he discusses rape by fraud and argues that deception in the inducement of sex is 
a societal expectation.7 Despite Mr. Rubenfeld’s contention that practicing deception to procure 
sex is a societal expectation, and one that he describes as not being that bad, it is evident that the 
opposite may be true.8 In many cases, using deception to procure sex is not a societal expectation 
of those that feel victimized by these practices. Though many may know it is a possibility, a 
woman does not expect to be lied to about a man’s identity or about something as important as 
his marital status. Lying about important facts or deceiving a woman into thinking you are 
somebody you’re not violates basic moral principles of truthfulness and forthrightness. When 
these principles are violated in a predatory nature to take advantage of another the actions should 
be criminalized. 
                                                 
5 See Stuart P. Green, Lying, Misleading, and Falsely Denying: How Moral Concepts Inform the 
Law of Perjury, Fraud, and False Statements, 53 Hastings L.J. 157, 158 (2001). 
6 Id. 
7 Jed Rubenfeld, The Riddle of Rape-by-Deception and the Myth of Sexual Autonomy, 122 Yale 
L.J. 1372, 1416 (2013). 
8 Id. 
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More importantly, just because society has come to expect something does not mean the 
expectation is morally sound and that it should be accepted. Many deceptive practices in 
procuring sex are clearly morally wrong and should not be tolerated or accepted by the 
individuals that are victimized by them, nor by the law. The courts have struggled with this fact 
in having to determine whether they can fit rape by fraud into statutes that required force. The 
law often encourages moral practices in both criminal laws and elsewhere. Regardless of what 
you want to call it, rape by fraud, rape by deception, sex by deception, or something totally 
different, it is often morally wrong and when it results in harm to victims the law should respond 
by criminalizing the conduct. As an added benefit, criminalizing deceptive practices in the 
procurement of sex because it is deemed harmful, immoral behavior will play a reciprocal role in 
forming better moral judgments in individuals and developing healthy social mores. This would 
mean that those that have expected deception in efforts to induce sex may no longer have to 
expect it, or at least no longer have to accept it. 
III. Development of Rape Law 
a. Rape Reform as a Shift in Societal Expectations 
Modern developments in rape law can largely be credited to new ways of thinking about 
sex and the criminalization of sex. Many of the developments and changes in what is 
criminalized by rape laws can be traced back to what the American society views as morally 
acceptable or wrong when it comes to sexual norms. One of the biggest problems we face with 
criminalizing sexual behavior is that what is deemed as the norm when it comes to a taboo 
subject like sex is an ever-moving target. This leads to constant changes in rape laws, and at 
times, extremely inconsistent laws from state to state. In the past, as shown by the traditional 
definition of rape, rape law only forbade a relatively narrow set of actions in a narrow set of 
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circumstances compared to the reaches of the law today. At common law rape was defined 
simply as “the carnal knowledge of a woman forcibly and against her will.” 9  After years of 
development and reform of rape law, almost none of this traditional definition stands alone as 
good law anymore. 
The law has changed from the basic outdated way of viewing rape defined above. Today 
the definition of rape has become gender neutral, New Jersey’s statute for example is written so 
that rape law no longer only applies to actions against women, but extends to cases where a man 
is raped and a man or woman can be the victim or perpetrator. 10 Rape laws also no longer apply 
to only carnal knowledge but will generally extend to any type of penetration of a body cavity 
including forms of oral sex.11 One of the most glaring examples of an outdated societal norm that 
was codified in our law was the marital exemption. Courts were unanimous in holding that once 
married a woman was deemed to have consented to sex and no matter what force was involved, 
or whether it was against her will or not, a wife could not be raped by her husband. 12 The marital 
exemption to rape existed in some jurisdictions into the 1980s before courts began to eliminate 
them.13 The elimination of the marital exemption was a realization that the exemption was based 
on ludicrous societal norms and expectations that no longer had any basis in modern American 
society. Many of these same outdated expectations having to do with the subordination of 
women offer reasoning for the complete rejection of the criminalization of rape by fraud. Like 
                                                 
9 Michael G. Walsh, Annotation, Criminal responsibility of husband for rape, or assault to 
commit rape, on wife, 24 A.L.R.4th 105 (1983); Com. v. Chretien, 417 N.E.2d 1203, 1206 
(Mass. 1981). 
10 N.J. Stat. § 2C:14-2 (2014). 
11 Rose v. Locke, 423 U.S. 48, 52 (1975). 
12 24 A.L.R. 4th 105. 
13 See State v. Smith, 426 A.2d 38 (1981). 
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the marital exemption this flat rejection can no longer be supported by societal norms and 
expectations. 
The issue of force in the definition of rape is still a mainstay in the law but has developed 
and taken on different meanings from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. Historically, rape law focused 
on rape as a physically assaultive crime against another. This fact is evidenced by the long-
standing force and victim resistance requirements in rape laws. Although force seemingly has 
little to do with deception, a look into the development of rape crimes and the force requirement 
offers insight to why it has taken so long for rape by deception to even become an issue, and why 
it is time to seriously consider it as criminal behavior.  
To be convicted of rape in the past many states required not only that the offender use 
some type of force, but also that the victim had resisted the offender. 14 In some states resistance 
is a fact-based inquiry, which included looking at several factors such as the victim’s age and 
physical attributes in relation to the offender. 15  When a case did not involve a victim being 
threatened courts have went as far as requiring that a victim’s resistance be by overt physical acts 
and finding that verbal refusal or resistance unaccompanied by physical acts is not enough to 
uphold a rape conviction.16 These courts viewed a failure to physically resist by the victim as 
akin to consent, and without this resistance the act could not be rape. 17  Courts have even 
explained the resistance element as requiring a woman’s utmost physical resistance be overcome 
to uphold a rape conviction.18 These requirements are relevant because they offer insight into 
why rape law did not cover fraudulently induced sex and show just how blatantly unprotected 
                                                 
14 65 Am. Jur., Rape, § 4 (2014). 
15 C.M. v. State, 889 So. 2d 57 (Ala. Crim. App. 2004). 
16 Mills v. U.S., 164 U.S. 644 (1897). 
17 Id. 
18 State v. Schmear, 135 N.W.2d 842, 845 (Wis. 1965). 
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women have been in regards to what the law considers conduct rising to the level of criminal in a 
rape case. These factor-based tests are more focused on making sure the victim is not lying about 
consenting to sex then they are about protecting them from victimization. 
Requiring a victim to resist an offender with physical acts in order to meet the force 
requirement of rape law reveals that the crime of rape historically and in some cases still does 
focus on the physically assaultive nature of the offense. However, requiring a victim to 
physically resist and even considering factors such as the size of the victim in relation to the size 
of the offender ignores and leaves out acts which can be just as damaging or even more 
damaging to some victims. Although the assaultive nature of the crime will often leave victims 
physically and psychologically damaged, the event can in some cases be just as damaging, or 
even more damaging to some victims when the assaultive element is absent from the offense. 
Fraudulently induced sex, whether it be by impersonation or lies can be equally psychologically 
damaging, it is also just as physically violative of bodily integrity and additionally often destroys 
an individuals ability to trust in others or harms their own feeling of self-worth and intelligence 
because of the deception that they fell for. Recently there has been a shift in some states focusing 
on the sexual nature of the offense and the details leading up to the sexual act instead of focusing 
on force and resistance. 
 It is only very recently that some states have eliminated the resistance requirement in rape 
laws completely.19 Some courts have only went as far as holding that a state no longer needs to 
prove victim resistance, but that a state still needs to prove that the use of force or the threat of 
force caused the victim to engage in the intercourse. 20 Other states have removed the resistance 
requirement and now only require proof that the intercourse took place without the victim’s 
                                                 
19 65 Am. Jur., Rape, § 4. 
20 Mahon, 905 A.2d at 683. 
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consent.21 New Jersey, for example, has gone to the opposite extreme in doing away with the 
resistance requirement. The Supreme Court of New Jersey, in an opinion that is still 
controversial to many, held that the only force necessary to constitute sexual assault is the 
underlying act of sexual penetration if it was engaged in by the defendant without affirmative 
and freely-given permission or consent to that specific act.22  
 It is clear from an overview of historical rape law that when it came to sex women were 
viewed as a property interest when married. When unmarried they fared no better, women had to 
physically resist or could not have possibly expected that a man know they were not asking for 
sex. The law was concerned that without these protections women might lie about what 
happened with men. Rape by fraud was not a consideration because if a woman was consenting 
to sex out of wedlock she was viewed as overly promiscuous and once she clearly consented to 
sex deserves not protection from the law and could not possibly be harmed regardless of whether 
she was fraudulently induced. The modern reforms in rape law have slowly but surely done away 
with these remnants of an archaic way of thinking about sex that were codified into our laws. 
However, even though the language in many statutes has been removed the greatest hurdle to 
true reform in rape law remains the approach to criminalization of sexual offenses. It is clear just 
from the fact that laws such as the marital exemption survived into the 1980s that their still exists 
in the law in general, but more specifically in rape law remnants of this patriarchal society’s 
view on sex. Though some states have attempted to protect women from harm through broader 
rape laws more effectively than others, there still exists a great disconnect from what is 
criminalized and what sexual conduct causes harm.  
                                                 
21 Com. v. Andrulewicz, 911 A.2d 162, 165 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2006). 
22 State in Interest of M.T.S., 609 A.2d 1266, 1277 (N.J. 1992). 
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The development in the law in states such as New Jersey, which have all but removed 
any true force requirement, represent an important change in how the crime of rape or sexual 
assault is approached. Though the law is still written in a way that requires force, the removal of 
the resistance requirement from the law and the requirement that affirmative consent be given to 
each independent sexual act shifts the focus away from the actual physical assault by the 
perpetrator and focuses on protecting the victim. In a state like New Jersey the force requirement 
essentially has become a pretense while the law now focuses on the facts surrounding the sexual 
acts from start to finish in determining whether the victim consented to each act. Focusing on the 
victim’s decisions, choices and actions that go into consenting to a sexual act can only logically 
lead one to question. What facts should be considered in determining the offensiveness of a 
sexual act? If the law goes one step further in assessing what causes harm to a victim and truly 
seeks to vindicate an individuals intentions and to protect them from predatory conduct, then 
facts of deception and fraud should be included the category of offensive sexual conduct rising to 
the level of criminality. 
Putting the focus on whether the victim gave affirmative consent is the beginning of a 
shift away from the absurd, archaic notion of protecting a man from a woman scorned that may 
lie about the event, which was a part of the reasoning behind force and resistance requirements. 
Rape law has always subordinated women and even sought to put blame on the victim, whether 
it was through the marital exemption or requiring a woman to physically resist an offender. The 
law has now begun to recognize that the actions of an offender in a sexual act can be extremely 
damaging and harmful to a woman regardless of whether it took physical force to accomplish the 
act. The change in these laws reflects a change in societal norms and expectations of the equality 
of women.  
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Though the law has begun to recognize that rape laws need to be more protective of 
women, it has not gone nearly far enough. Just as a sexual act can be highly offensive and 
extremely harmful to women when accomplished without force and without affirmative consent, 
so too can a sexual act accomplished with affirmative consent but procured through the use of 
fraud. In fact, just like when a crime such as theft committed by fraud may be more harmful to a 
victim than theft by force, sex obtained through the use of fraud can also be more harmful to a 
woman than the force required rape laws in place today. This fact is recognized to an extent in 
very specific sets of circumstances, as explained below. 
b. Rape Through the Use of Fraud is Already Criminalized to an Extent 
In a very narrow set of circumstances the law has recognized that sex procured through 
the use of fraud is offensive, harmful and deservedly is criminalized. Where the traditional 
definition of rape as requiring force and non-consent is applicable, generally if consent to the 
sexual act was given the act will not be rape despite being obta ined through fraudulent means.23 
However, rape by deception already exists in two distinct categories, rape by impersonation and 
rape by fraudulent representation. Rape by impersonation historically criminalized the act of 
pretending to be a woman’s husband in order to procure sex from her.24 Rape by fraudulent 
representation criminalizes the act of procuring sex under the guise of medical treatment.25 
Although rape by impersonation of a husband has been a known exception to the force 
requirement, it wrongfully remains a point of contention. Some states have statutory provisions 
                                                 
23 B. K. Carpenter, Annotation, Rape by fraud or impersonation, 91 A.L.R.2d 591 (1963).  
24 65 Am. Jur. 2d Rape § 9 (2014). 
25 Jay M. Zitter, Annotation, Conviction of rape or related sexual offenses on basis of intercourse 
accomplished under the pretext of, or in the course of, medical treatment, 65 A.L.R.4th 1064 
(1988). 
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that expressly criminalize this fraudulent conduct as rape. 26 Quite amazingly, despite the obvious 
offensiveness and harm of procuring sex through impersonating the spouse of another, other 
states have not addressed this conduct statutorily and the courts have refused to extend current 
laws to criminalize rape by impersonation, simply holding that the requisite force is not present 
in these situations because the sex is consensual. 27  In jurisdictions where this conduct is 
rightfully criminalized it has recently been a subject of public criticism. 
California was one state that has an express statute that criminalizes as rape a situation 
“where [the victim] submits, under the belief that the person committing the act is her husband, 
and this belief is induced by any artifice, pretense, or concealment practiced by the accused, with 
intent to induce such belief.”28 In People v. Morales, the state had charged the defendant with 
rape under this statute in a situation where the defendant was not impersonating the unmarried 
victim’s husband, but was impersonating the victim’s boyfriend. 29  The court ultimately 
“reluctantly” held, that despite the clear offensiveness of the conduct and harm caused that this 
statute as written does not apply to the impersonation of a boyfriend and therefore dismissed the 
rape charge. 30  This decision sparked public outrage in Californians who rightfully could not 
believe that the impersonation of a husband to procure sex would be criminal but the same 
circumstances for an unmarried woman would leave her without justice.  
In response to the public outcry, just last year the California legislature adopted new 
statutory language for rape by fraud, which reads, “where a person submits under the belief that 
                                                 
26 State v. Navarro, 367 P.2d 227, 228 (Ariz. 1961); State v. Williams, 37 S.E. 952, 953 (N.C. 
1901). 
27 Suliveres v. Com., 865 N.E.2d 1086, 1090 (Mass. 2007); See People v. Hough, 607 N.Y.S.2d 
884 (1994); See also Com. v. Duchnicz, 59 Pa. Super. 527 (Pa. 1915). 
28 Cal. Penal Code § 261(a)(5) (2013).  
29 Morales, 150 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 928. 
30 Id. 
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the person committing the act is someone known to the victim other than the accused, and this 
belief is induced by any artifice, pretense, or concealment practiced by the accused, with intent to 
induce the belief.”31 The language change was in direct response to the Morales case and now 
clearly criminalizes rape by impersonation broadly when a victim submits to sex because of the 
offender’s impersonation of anyone other than himself or herself. Although California’s rape by 
fraud statute still has a relatively narrow application the Morales decision, the resulting public 
opinion and these recent changes signify a desire from society and courts alike to expand the 
criminalization of rape by fraud or deception. 
The second category of rape by fraud, which historically targeted the procurement of sex 
by a doctor under the pretense that his actions were for medical treatment, has been criminalized 
under traditional rape laws by courts and expressly through statutes. In cases where rape statutes 
required the action to be performed by force and against the victim’s will, courts have held that 
the requisite force was met by the sexual act alone when a doctor used a gynecological exam as 
pretext to have sex with his patient because the victim has no opportunity to consent when 
unaware of the intentions involved.32 Even in cases dating back to the 1800s’ courts were willing 
to hold that force requirements were met by the wrongful act itself when intercourse occurred 
under the pretense of a medical examination.33  
Despite the obvious wrongfulness of this conduct that courts in the 1800s’ were willing to 
recognize other courts still rejected this reasoning. Allowing what can only be described as a 
ludicrous result, some courts held that the element of force is not meant when a doctor procures 
                                                 
31 Cal. Penal Code § 261(a)(5) (2013). 
32 Borak, 301 N.E.2d at 5. 
33 Pomeroy, 94 Ind. at 101; See also State v. Atkins, 292 S.W. 422 (Mo. 1926). 
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sex under a false pretense of medical treatment. 34 But this reasoning was not limited to courts in 
the 1800s’. A Massachusetts court in 1959 held that when the rape statute requires force, 
fraudulently procured sex under the guise of a proposed medical treatment cannot take the place 
of force requirements and therefore was not criminal. 35 The court reasoned that, “the essence of 
the crime was not the fact of intercourse but the injury and outrage of the feelings of the woman 
by the forceful penetration of her person.”36 This reasoning is another example of an outdated 
approach to rape law, which focused only on the physically assaultive nature of the crime and 
operated under the false assumption that no harm occurs to those who have their bodies violated 
by an offender who uses a position of trust to procure sex without the consent of a woman rather 
than using force to achieve the same objective. In either scenario there is a vict im who has had a 
sense of trust, security, and, or bodily integrity violated who deserves to be protected by the law. 
Despite some courts’ rejection of rape by fraud under statutes that require force, other 
states have codified rape by fraud in statutes that are specifically targeted to apply to medical 
misrepresentation, but were also written broadly. California for example, in addition to having 
branch of the law that criminalizes specifically rape by impersonation also has a broad rape by 
fraud statute that criminalizes medical misrepresentation. California’s rape by fraud statute states 
that rape occurs when sex is accomplished “where a person is at the time unconscious of the 
nature of the act, and this is known to the accused.”37 The statute goes on to state that a person is 
unconscious of the nature of the act when the person “was not aware, knowing, perceiving, or 
cognizant of the essential characteristics of the act due to the perpetrator's fraud in fact or was 
                                                 
34 Don Moran v. People, 12 Am.Rep. 283 (Mich. 1872); See Walter v. People, 1867 WL 6248 
(N.Y. Gen. Term. 1867). 
35 Com. v. Goldenberg, 155 N.E.2d 187, 192 (Mass. 1959). 
36 Id. 
37 Cal. Penal Code. § 261(a)(4) (2013). 
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not aware, knowing, perceiving, or cognizant of the essential characteristics of the act due to the 
perpetrator's fraudulent representation that the sexual penetration served a professional purpose 
when it served no professional purpose.”38  
This statute clearly aims to criminalize the scenario where a doctor procures sex from a 
patient by a fraudulent representation that the sexual penetration is for medical treatment when it 
did not serve any medical treatment. However, more importantly the statute does not specifically 
state medical treatment but rather criminalizes the conduct when it is fraudulently obtained 
through any false professional purpose. In fact, in People v. Bautista, the statute was already 
broadly constructed when the court applied the professional purpose element to a clergyman who 
fraudulently obtained sexual penetration of a female under the guise of a professional purpose.39 
In Bautista, the defendant used his position of trust as a clergyman with a young girl to procure 
penetration, explaining to her that his penetration was to check her virginity for religious 
reasons.40 The court held that this conduct was a fraudulent representation that the penetration 
served a professional purpose, reasoning that the focus of the statute was to criminalize “the  
perpetrator’s fraudulent representation that is used to take advantage of an unknowing and 
vulnerable victim.”41 This line of reasoning by the court is relatively new in American law but it 
is the crux of the reasoning behind rape by fraud criminalization. Although this statute has yet to 
be applied more broadly than in these impersonation or professional purpose situations it is a 
promising start for the criminalization of rape by deception. The fact that courts have already 
broadly construed the law leaves open the possibility of a broader category of conduct being 
criminalized when sex is procured through fraud or deception. The important recognition of the 
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Bautista court is that victims can certainly be violated and harmed when they are taken 
advantage of in fraudulent scenarios just as they are harmed when they are taken advantage of by 
force. 
c. Why Fraud in the Fact vs. Fraud in the Inducement is an Improper 
Distinction 
As stated above, the California rape by fraud statute also includes as a victim, a person 
who is not aware of an essential characteristic of the act due to an offender’s fraud in fact.42 
Historically, jurisdictions that did recognize rape by fraud distinguished between two categories, 
fraud in the fact and fraud in the inducement. Fraud in the fact refers to a situation in which an 
offender obtains consent to perform one act but engages in another. 43  Because consent was 
obtained only to a non-sexual act and that consent was fraudulently used to obtain nonconsensual 
sexual penetration, the court was willing to find that fraud in the fact vitiated consent and 
constituted rape under existing laws.44 For example, the doctor who obtains consent to perform a 
gynecological exam but uses that consent to procure sexual penetration commits fraud in the 
fact. Fraud in the inducement occurs when a perpetrator uses deception or misrepresents a fact 
leading up to the act but performs the exact act that they stated relying on the misrepresentation 
to gain consent.45 For example, the predatory man who lies about his marital status in orde r to 
procure sexual penetration commits fraud in the inducement. In fraud in the inducement cases, 
courts were unwilling to extend criminal liability because although it was obtained through 
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fraudulent pretenses, the act that occurred was consented to by the victim and that the fraud did 
not vitiate the consent as it does in a fraud in the factum scenario.46 
The distinction between fraud in the fact and fraud in the inducement  serves no purpose 
and offers little as to what conduct should be, or even has been criminalized. First off, in the case 
of the man posing to be a woman’s husband she is consenting to the act itself but the act is 
induced by fraud. Despite this clearly being a case of fraud in the inducement and not fraud in 
the fact is has already been commonly criminalized. The worthlessness of the distinction is 
further evidenced by the fact that modern rape by fraud laws and courts have all but eliminated 
the distinction. By expressly adopting laws criminalizing rape by fraud in fraud in the 
inducement scenarios such as professional misrepresentation and impersonation California has 
essentially done away with the idea that only fraud in the fact could constitute rape because of 
the consent present in a fraud in the inducement scenario. California courts have further 
invalidated this distinction by construing statutes broadly to find scenarios that are criminal 
under the rape by fraud statute despite being considered rape in the inducement in cases such as 
Bautista. As stated above the Morales court expressly stated that there is clear harm in these 
inducement cases and California reacted by expanding the law. 47 These decisions point to the 
fallacy in the reasoning that only fraud in the fact vitiates consent or that it is somehow 
automatically more harmful than fraud in the inducement.  
Under today’s societal expectations it cannot reasonably be believed that when a doctor 
lies about what procedure they are going to perform to have sex it is rightfully criminal as fraud 
in the fact because the sex was consented, but when a perpetrator impersonates a significant 
other and a victim has sex with them believing them to be their significant other, it is not 
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criminal as fraud in the inducement, because the sexual act was consented to. As the California 
courts realized this distinction leads to ludicrous results that criminalizes some individuals and 
protects others despite equally morally wrong, offensive and harmful conduct. More importantly, 
fraud in the inducement can and often will lead to an individual who was wrongfully taken 
advantage of because of a misrepresentation and is harmed in some cases even more than an 
individual who was the victim of fraud in the fact and just as the latter deserves to be protected 
by our criminal laws, so does the former. This was clearly evidenced by California post-Morales 
and needs to be widely recognized elsewhere. Just because a victim in a case like Morales 
consents to the act and is only fraudulently deceived in the inducement of sex it does not mean 
she is unharmed. The same violation of bodily integrity exists in both scenarios and the same 
offensive predatory intention is present and therefore the same criminal laws should apply to 
both scenarios. 
IV. Jed Rubenfeld’s Riddle of Rape-by-Deception 
In his article entitled The Riddle of Rape-By-Deception and the Myth of Sexual 
Autonomy, Jed Rubenfeld describes the issues of the criminalization of rape-by-deception. He 
ultimately reaches the conclusion that rape by deception should not be criminalized.48 Rubenfeld 
discusses what he and others believe would be the implications of accepting rape by deception 
and dismisses the possibility of a workable rape by deception scheme.49 His article is important 
to explore in depth because it raises several important questions about criminalizing rape by 
fraud, all of which need to be answered. 
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Despite acknowledging that deception to procure sex can in some cases vitiate consent, 
Rubenfeld comes to the conclusion that rape by deception should not be criminalized. 50  In 
reaching his conclusion Rubenfeld argues that a general criminalization of sex by deception 
would lead to bad results in the law.51 He specifically raises a scenario of a minor lying about her 
age, having sex with an adult and argues that if sex by deception were criminalized this scenario 
would lead to her being a victim of statutory rape and rape by deception. 52 First off, this is one 
type of conduct that laws against rape by deception could be preventing from happening by 
essentially protecting possible offenders from themselves. Criminalization is an important 
deterrent for the conduct that Rubenfeld discusses and it is possible that criminalizing deceiving 
someone about their identity would prevent a minor from committing the act in the first place. 
Secondly, in addition to potentially stopping many juveniles from falling victim to the urge to lie 
about their age to those older than them it would also further protect them from predatory 
statutory rapists.  
Additionally, the result that a minor’s foolish conduct may result in them being both the 
victim and an offender is nothing new to the law. In today’s technological era an issue regularly 
faced is child pornography. Often young girls send images of themselves to others, which under 
the law is distribution of child pornography and then in turn become victims when the picture 
gets sent elsewhere. This result has lead to increased awareness of the danger of this conduct and 
has likely deterred the conduct in some. Whether to charge the minor who is clearly a victim and 
an offender by statutory definitions becomes one of prosecutorial discretion and it is perfectly 
reasonable to expect just as in the case of child pornography that children are not going to be 
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charged with serious crimes at will because of the understanding that they are also a victim in the 
scenario. Therefore, Rubenfeld’s argument that this result would lead to absurd results does not 
have merit and it by no means should be the reason for rejecting the criminalization of rape by 
deception. The biggest flaw in Rubenfeld’s reasoning of why sex by deception ought not be 
criminal is the idea that people expect to be lied to in a sexual context. 53 He even intimates that 
in a world of general rape by deception laws something as simple as cosmetics misrepresent and 
could be considered criminal.54 Though it is clear that Rubenfeld does not actually believe that 
this would ever be a possible result of criminalization of sex by deception, he uses these extreme 
examples in an attempt to dismiss the idea of rape by deception. 55 However, Rubenfeld does 
concede the possibility that certain deception could be singled out as qualifying as criminal by 
statute.56  
Rubenfeld ultimately reaches the conclusion that the violation of an individual’s right to 
self-possession is what should be criminalized.57 His theory is based off the idea that everyone 
has the right to self-possession, meaning, the possession of one’s own body and that violations of 
this right to obtain sex is what should be considered rape. 58 He offers this theory of rape laws as 
a rationale for the continuing requirement of force and rejects the idea that psychological forces 
could be included in rape laws under a the theory of self-possession. 59  His right to self-
possession theory ultimately casts aside rape by deception because in a fraud scenario an 
individual consenting to the acts, though under false pretenses, is not losing the right to possess 
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their own body or the ability to do what they want with their body, in fact they could walk away 
from the situation at any moment because no force exists.60 
Rubenfeld’s right to self-possession theory opens loopholes for the offender who 
impersonates a loved one, or the professional who obtains sex through misrepresentation. It falls 
in line with old law that for years ignored the harm caused to victims by this conduct. Under this 
theory neither would have to be criminal because the victim never loses their right to self-
possession as they are in complete control over themselves at all times, are consenting in the 
moment to the action that is taking place and could walk away if they so chose. Secondly, the 
idea that it is a societal norm to expect deception in the world of sex is exaggerated and it is no 
excuse for protecting an offender who uses offensive deceptive practices to procure sex. 
Although it may be true that in the world of sex there exists some negligible deceptions that 
society has come to accept and expect this does not lead to a blanket conclusion that no rape by 
deception can be criminalized.  
In fact, despite the fact that society expects that they may be deceived by cosmetics and 
certain clothing when making a decision of who to have sex with, it is equally true that society 
has many expectations that are not vindicated when sex by deception is a legal practice. 61 
Ultimately, Rubenfeld’s logic falls flat because just as some deception is expected many other 
forms of deception are not expected. Most glaring of these societal expectations that would not 
be vindicated is in cases where an individual is taken advantage of and violated by someone 
impersonating a significant other or passing off an action as having a professional purpose when 
it does not. These cases would be criminalized even more narrowly and less often than they are 
now. It would also be a societal expectation that certain facts would be revealed before deciding 
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to have sex with another, such as marital status, gender and the presence of sexually transmitted 
diseases, that when lied about would leave an individual feeling violated. Though people are 
aware that people do lie about these things an individual does not expect to be lied to about 
details of such import about another’s identity. The idea that the law should vindicate these 
individual’s expectations and protect them from fraudulent practices that leave them feeling 
victimized is far from impractical and is not much of a riddle at all. 
V. How to Criminalize Rape by Fraud 
There is no doubt that criminalization of rape by fraud comes with issues and questions 
that need to be answered. As Rubenfeld points out there are many arguments against its 
criminalization that each need to be addressed as well. First, we must make the determination 
that rape by fraud is conduct that should be criminalized. Second, you need to determine how it 
will be criminalized and lastly and most difficultly the law must define the contours of rape by 
fraud.  
a) Drawing the Line 
The biggest obstacle that the criminalization of sex by deception faces is in determining 
what conduct would be considered criminal fraud. However, this is no new challenge in 
determining the criminalization of fraudulent activity and is certainly no reason to back down 
and allow the continued victimization of so many. The issue of rape by fraud is not specific to 
America and looking to international laws could offer some insight in how to approach this issue. 
Rape by fraud has recently been a point of contention in Israel specifically. In Israel rape 
includes intercourse obtained “with consent that was given through the use of fraud as to the 
nature of the actor or the essence of the act.”62 Israeli law separates rape by fraud similarly to the 
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way American law does. Fraud as to the essence of the act includes cases where a sexual act is 
performed under the guise of a professional purpose, while fraud as to the nature of the actor 
includes cases where someone fraudulently represents himself to procure sex. 63 However, fraud 
as to the nature of the actor has been construed to apply far more broadly than American courts 
have interpreted the law. In Saliman v. Israel, the rape by fraud as to the nature of the actor 
doctrine was affirmed when the defendant was convicted after he misrepresented himself as a 
housing official and promised a house to his victim if she had sex with him. 64 In another Israeli 
rape by fraud case a defendant was convicted under the rape by fraud statute when he lied about 
being both Jewish and single.65 
Once you criminalize rape by fraud distinctly separate from rape by force these decisions 
beg the question, where do you draw the line and what would qualify as criminally fraudulent in 
the procurement of sex? For starters the Saliman decision seems obvious. Though existing 
American rape law would never be able to find the defendant’s actions criminal, they should be. 
A defendant who fraudulently represents himself as an authority figure in the manner that the 
defendant in Saliman did is arguably the most offensive of criminals. Although other criminal 
statutes may prevent an individual from posing as a government official they do not vindicate the 
harm caused to a victim and often will not be as seriously punished. These defrauders prey on the 
vulnerable. First an offender determines what their weakness is and then exploits it for their own 
personal gain. Whether the objective of the fraud is to steal money or to procure sex it should be 
criminalized rather than enabled. The issue gets murkier in a case like Kashur. Surely, as 
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Rubenfeld stated Americans regularly lie about many facts like whether they are single or not in 
an effort to procure sex. But regularity of occurrence does not mean the law should permit these 
lies. People should have the right to decide whether or not to have sex with someone who is 
married for example, like the defendant in Kashur. When the decision to have sex is grounded in 
a fact that turns out to be untrue because of a carefully calculated move by a fraudulent man, like 
the defendant in Kashur, the conduct is morally wrongful and can certainly be harmful enough to 
warrant being criminal. The issue is, as the Saliman court and Rubenfeld intimated, is what about 
more innocent or “white” lies that are regularly told at the beginning of relationships? Should all 
lies used to procure sex be criminal? 
b) A Solution 
The answer is obviously, no. But that does not mean there is no solution that can allow 
for the criminalization of certain frauds and still leave as noncriminal, the innocent white lies. 
First off, as mentioned above having rape by fraud distinct from rape committed through the use 
of force in statutes is necessary. The distinction has already proven to allow for easier expansion 
of criminality when it is clearly deserved as we have seen from the California courts in Bautista 
and their changes in the law following Morales.  
The first potential solution is one that is suggested by the Saliman court, which states that 
the test for criminality of certain lies could be focused on whether the lies “are critical in the eyes 
of a reasonable woman.”66 A reasonableness test has its benefits. It would ensure that no victim 
of fraud in severe cases would suffer without justice because of non- inclusive laws. It would also 
allow for the screening out of what would be considered innocent lies that a reasonable person 
would not see as critical in the decision making process. However, the reasonableness test would 
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have several problems as well. For starters American criminal law often craves congruity and 
predictability in order to run efficiently. A reasonableness test would lead to major incongruities 
in what is found criminal because by its nature it is an uncertain test. Incongruity also leads to 
unpredictability which would likely bog down courts in a system that already suffers to remain 
efficient. Additionally, leaving the power to determine what is reasonable to the courts in a 
courtship situation also puts too much power in a court to set standards of societal morality.   
The second potential solution is to write rape by fraud statutes narrowly so that only 
specific lies and conduct are criminalized. Statutes would be written in a manner that 
criminalizes the procurement of sex through fraud or deception. The statute would go on to list 
conduct that qualifies as criminal deception such as misrepresentation of identity or lies about 
marital status or about whether an individual has sexually transmitted diseases. This solution 
would criminalize conduct in a manner that would often be reactive but would make for far more 
predictability. As long as these rape by fraud statutes are in place, the hope would be that when 
an offender commits a harmful act it can be fit into the constructs of the listed categories of 
deception like California did in the Bautista case. But the law would also need to be reactive and 
willing to change the law when cases come up that are clearly offensive but cannot fall within 
the constructs of the law like California did after the Morales case. Taking California as a test 
case, it is likely that the Saliman case would have come out the other way under California’s 
existing laws. The aim of this solution would be to take cases like Saliman after the fact, and 
amend the rape by fraud statute to include conduct that is clearly harmful and offensive fraud.  
The biggest downfall under this criminalization scheme would be that cases like Saliman 
would slip through the cracks until lawmakers could respond. However, this statutory scheme 
would allow for congruity in what is considered criminal because it would be listed by statute. 
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Clearly defining what is criminal fraud statutorily allows the law to be predictable and for the 
judicial system to run more efficiently. Though both solutions have their pros and cons this 
solution is ultimately more desirable. The key to the solution is of course that rape by fraud 
statutes are put into place. The existence of separate rape by fraud statutes alone would be a great 
step forward in preventing some of the fraudulent practices that our law has allowed for so long.  
The exact decisions on specific lies to be criminalized under this method would be le ft to 
lawmakers who would be more ably equipped to respond to the expectations of victims. It is 
most important that the criminal law begin to recognize the clear harm in some rape by fraud 
cases and criminalize the conduct by statute in order to put a stop to the inconsistencies in the 
law and the enablement of rape by fraud. For example, the incongruity between states like 
California criminalizing misrepresentation of identity in a case like Morales where the defendant 
was believed to be the victim’s boyfriend as rape, while other states like Massachusetts have not 
even found this type of conduct to be criminal at all cannot be tolerated.  
At the least, States need to have clear rape by fraud statutes that criminalize deception 
such as misrepresentation of authority figures, misrepresentation of medical treatments or 
professional purpose and impersonation of another. The next step would be to determine what 
other lies leave an individual feeling victimized. Having these statutes as a baseline then allows 
the law to determine whether it be through studies done to determine psychological harm to 
victims caused by these lies or in a reactive manner like in California post-Morales. Potentially 
criminal lies about important details of ones identity in a courtship situation could even include 
lying about marital status or whether an individual has a sexually transmitted disease. Although 
to some criminalization of these lies as rape may seem radical, it is not totally out of left field. As 
discussed above Israel has already upheld similar statutes criminalizing as rape by fraud lies 
 30 
about marital status and religion.67 California has rape by fraud statutes and since they were put 
into place the statutes have been broadly applied by courts and expanded by the legislature.  
Most recently lawmakers in New Jersey have introduced a rape by fraud bill that would 
go beyond any rape by fraud statute currently existing in America. 68 The bill was introduced by 
Assemblyman Troy Singleton and would criminalize “sexual assault by fraud” which would be 
defined as “an act of sexual penetration to which a person has given consent because the actor 
has misrepresented the purpose of the act or has represented he is someone he is not.” 69 
Singleton stated that “we have to look at the issue of rape as more than sexual contact without 
consent.”70 It is his belief that fraud invalidates consent just as forcible sexual contact does.71 
The bill was in response to a woman who was victimized by a serial bigamist and would 
therefore seem to extend to lies about details such as marital status.72 Although this bill has just 
been introduced and may not pass, it further evidences that society is ready for a different 
approach to rape law. Lawmakers are beginning to recognize that rape by fraud victimizes many 
leaving them with no redress from the law. It is time that other States follow suit and introduce 
legislation of their own to criminalize rape by fraud. 
V. Conclusion 
What is most evident in deciding whether rape by deception should be criminalized is  
that determining the parameters would be far from easy. However, the law has enabled violative 
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fraudulent practices in the procurement of sex leaving many individuals victimized without any 
recourse or justice for far too long. It is clear that the law has failed and it is time the law do 
more to protect victims from these invidious fraudulent practices. Whether States decide to call it 
rape or something entirely different such as fraudulently obtained sex, or sexual assault by 
deception it is time the laws recognize this conduct as criminal. The enactment of rape by fraud 
statutes separate and distinct from rape by force statutes as we have seen in California across all 
jurisdictions would be a promising beginning. From there it would be up to courts and 
lawmakers to make the difficult determinations of what fraudulent acts would constitute criminal 
rape by fraud. So long as rape by fraud statutes are in place the law will finally begin preventing 
rather than enabling the victimization of individuals through rape by fraud. 
 
